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Previous research suggests that competition in the low-skilled labor market
associated with Latino immigration is related to crime for rural whites and urban blacks.
Furthermore, studies suggest that communities can selectively enforce norms regarding
crimes. This study tested whether low-skill job competition associated with Latino
immigration is correlated with higher rates of drug use than drug dealing, and higher rates
of instrumental crimes than expressive crimes. Furthermore, this study tested whether
urban blacks were more affected than urban whites, and rural whites more than rural
blacks. The results did not support the original hypotheses, except that urban blacks were
more affected than urban whites. This suggests support for Anderson’s Code of the
Street. However, differing crime increases between rural and urban areas suggests that
Anderson’s theory may not work everywhere. Lastly, the control variables suggest that
the race-crime relationship may be more complex when other factors are controlled for
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The relationship between immigration and crime is one that has been surrounded
by controversy and inconsistencies in American history. From the massacre of indigenous
people in early colonial days, to the Trump administration’s moves against Muslim and
Mexican immigrants, America has had difficult relations with immigrants from all parts
of the world in its brief history. Though the cultural contributions made by many groups
of immigrants have been invaluable for the diversity of America, attitudes and legislation
surrounding immigration have made peaceful immigration reform an arduous task. One
of the more consistent hindrances to peaceful immigration reform is the immigrationcrime relationship. Particularly, the relationship between Latino immigration and crime
comes under much scrutiny in contemporary political discourse. Though data show that
there is no consistent link between immigration and crime in traditional destinations,
preconceived notions about a causal relationship remain (O’Kane, 1992; Tanton &
Lutton, 1993; Martinez & Lee, 1998; Reid et al, 2005).
One unintended effect of immigration restrictions in the 1990s was that low-skill
Latino workers essentially became trapped in American borders, causing a growth in the
number of Latinos in both rural and urban areas (Durand & Massey, 2006; Massey et al,
2003). Coupled with the increased number of Latino immigrants, deindustrialization
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reduced the number of low-skill jobs available to Americans in numerous industries.
Previous studies (e.g. Shihedah & Ousey, 1998; Shihedah & Barranco, 2010a; Shihedah
& Barranco, 2010b) show that the loss of entry-level, low-skilled jobs in both rural and
urban areas leads to higher rates of criminal offending for both blacks and whites.
For Latinos, moving to new immigration destinations tends to have an increase in
the amount of criminal offending due to the socially disorganizing effects of being in an
area with few social ties to an established Latino community (Durrand et al, 2000;
Durrand, Massey, and Capoferro, 2005; Leach & Bean, 2008; Lichter et. al, 2010). In
conjunction with the effects of the ceasing of circular work visas and the shrinking lowskill job availability, job competition becomes greater for whites and blacks in both rural
and urban workforces. This, as previously noted, leads to higher rates of criminal
offending. Many of the propositions set forth by social disorganization theory have been
noted as having explanatory abilities for this phenomenon due to the relationship between
unemployment, poverty, and crime (Kassarda & Janowitz, 1974; Messner & Tardif,
1986; Shihadeh & Steffensmeier, 1994; Messner, 1988).
Previous studies have shown that even socially disorganized communities
potentially have the ability to selectively enforce some norms more than others. When
jobs are not as available due to competition, then certain parts of the community may not
enforce norms pertaining to crimes like drug manufacturing and distribution as heavily
since legitimate avenues for income are scarce. However, it is unlikely that crimes like
drug possession would receive the same treatment, since these types of crimes do not
bring money in to those who engage in the activity. Therefore, this study will examine
whether, in communities where the low-skill job market has shifted in favor of Latinos,
2

drug manufacturing and distribution crimes have increased significantly higher than drug
possession crimes. Additionally, following the idea of crimes that bring in income
occurring more frequently, this study will examine if instrumental crimes (robbery, theft,
and motor vehicle theft) have increased significantly higher than expressive crimes (rape,
murder, and assault) in these same areas. Furthermore, this study will examine whether
this effect is different for metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.

3

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND

Social Disorganization Theory
Social Disorganization Theory is a criminological tradition that has existed since
its sociological infancy in the early 1920s (Krohn et al.,2009). Though it did not come
into the realm of criminology until the 1940s, its implications for crime began before
then. Since its conception, social disorganization theory has gone through numerous
alterations and extensions, many of these revolving around specifications of the
clarification of the theory’s concepts and central tenants, as well as attempts to
empirically test the components of the theory. This theory has had a major impact on the
study of criminological behavior, including a movement away from the biosocial
approaches to studying crime where the focus of study was on the individual (Krohn et
al.,2009). Rather than focusing on the individual, social disorganization theory focuses on
where people live, and why this may influence them to commit crime/deviance. Though
this theory fell out of popularity for a time, more recent revisions and testing has sparked
renewed interest, and has consequently resulted a number of theorists attempting to adapt
and extend social disorganization theory today. (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003).
Early inspiration for Social Disorganization Theory can be found in the work by
Emile Durkheim. Durkheim believed that society, in order to maintain control over the
4

activities of its people, needed to maintain a certain level of integration and solidarity
(Durkheim, 1933). Without this control, Durkheim believed that people would abide by
hedonistic principles and fall into crime. He also believed that a society’s collective
consciousness, social structures, and social solidarity must evolve alongside them in
order to meet a society’s needs (Durkheim, 1933). Collective consciousness affected
people’s perceptions of behaviors and what constitutes a crime, while social solidarity
affected social control and the relationships between people. All of these functions of a
society must adapt in response to changes in society for control to be effective
(Durkheim, 1933). However, as societies became more and more complex, both
collective consciousness and social solidarity weakened. This is especially true in a
rapidly expanding modern society, thus creating further degrees of complexity. Though
not labeled social disorganization at the time, early traces of this theory can be seen here.
Social Disorganization theory gained traction in the Chicago School during the
early 1920s (Krohn et al.,2009). Early fixations on immigration were influential for the
Chicago School in developing ideas about how social webs became disrupted. Early 20th
century public policy focused heavily on how immigration from Eastern Europe (Rubin,
1941) and the migration of blacks from the South affected crime (Grossman, 1991). A
large amount of these newly arriving people moved to low-income areas that already had
issues with integration and crime (Shaw & McKay, 1942). The correlation gave rise to
the idea of an “immigrant problem” in American society (Leuchtenberg, 1942). However,
as paradigms shifted from the social Darwinist mindset to more ecological, social
causation approaches, the places where people lived began to receive more attention than
the people themselves.
5

Some of the earlier notions of social (dis)organization can be found in the works
of Park and Burgess. In their earlier works, the concept of social control was considered
to be of great importance in understanding how different kinds of people can interact
without calamity and disarray being the norm (Park and Burgess, 1924). Social control
and social stability, therefore, were of utmost importance for communities.
Park and Burgess began this theoretical tradition by examining the effects of
growing urbanization, industrialization, and immigration on the city of Chicago (Park and
Burgess, 1925). They were particularly interested in the effects that these events had on
social organization. Parks and Burgess had backgrounds in human ecology, so their focus
was not on how this influenced crime, but people more generally (Park and Burgess,
1925). They concluded that the expansion of modern cities, and its effects, was akin to
evolution in the animal world. This led to the development of their Concentric Zone
Theory.
Concentric Zone theory proposed that cities can be divided into separate zones,
where the most inner part (the Central Business District) housed most of the industries,
factories, and offices, and the areas directly outside of this were the less desirable areas to
live in (Park and Burgess, 1925). The more one ventured out from the CBD, the more
residential the areas became. The expansion of the CBD led to deterioration of the areas
in and directly adjacent to it. The Transition Zone, which was the area that surrounded
the CBD, was a mix of residential areas and developing businesses (Park and Burgess,
1925). As the name suggests, the Transition Zone referred to the area where business and
factories were beginning to develop. Though not fully destroyed, the residential areas in
the Transition Zone were deteriorating. Park and Burgess predicted that this expansion
6

led to social disorganization within these areas, where communities were noticeably less
organized and intact. They noted how cities can be divided into sections of being more or
less (dis)organization (Park and Burgess, 1925).
Park and Burgess’s theory did not include crime as part of the equation. It was not
until Shaw & McKay took the idea of social disorganization and applied it to theories of
delinquency that this originated (Shaw & McKay, 1942). In the 1940s, Shaw and McKay
examined how differences in social, economic, and cultural conditions paralleled varying
rates of delinquency in certain communities (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Their concern
focused on how economic, social, and cultural conditions correspond with crime and
delinquency, and how this all is affected by population composition (Shaw & McKay,
1942). They were also concerned with how crime becomes considered normal in these
communities, and what the implications of varying rates of delinquency in different
communities were. After collecting official data on juvenile delinquency and conducting
extensive fieldwork in Chicago, they determined that concentrations of delinquency were
higher in commercial and industrial areas (Shaw & McKay, 1942). The characteristics of
these areas included concentrations of poverty, residential mobility, and population
heterogeneity (Shaw & McKay, 1942). These would become the three tenets of early
social disorganization theory. These findings, as well as those from Park and Burgess,
formed the early foundation of social disorganization theory. This offset the notions
proposed by biosocial theories that stated individual attributes led to crime, and focused
on what about the places where people lived affected rates of delinquency (Krohn et al,
2009).
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The theory fell out of popularity during the 1960s for numerous reasons (Kubrin
& Weitzer, 2003). The theory set forth by Shaw & McKay lacked clarity in how it
operationalized and conceptualized some of the tenets of social disorganization (Bursik,
1988). Bursik pointed out a number of criticisms with the theory, with one of his most
important criticisms being how early theorists did not clearly differentiate between the
causes and effects of social disorganization. Increased crime and delinquency could be
both a cause and effect of social disorganization, or part of social disorganization itself
(Bursik, 1988). Additionally, criticisms surrounded how the theory had relied on official
data, which bears many limitations, including how many communities are
overrepresented in arrest data, and how there are many crimes that may not be reported
(Sampson & Groves, 1989). Additionally, criticisms also involved the lack of testing of
the actual tenets of social disorganization theory. The predictive ability of the theory had
been displayed, but nothing beyond what Shaw & McKay showed (Sampson & Groves,
1989). Many theorists contributed to the revitalization of social disorganization theory.
Due to their contributions, the theory has been both specified and expanded to attempt to
gain more clarity.
Kornhauser (1978) attempted to reformulate and better elaborate on social
disorganization theory as more of a control theory. She described early work by Thrasher
as being viable for describing gang activity, but only moderately successful in correlating
control and delinquency. She summarized Thrasher’s study of gangs in Chicago as
displaying how gang activity is a quest for order, but argued that it did not go far enough
to link social control and delinquency (Kornhauser, 1978). Korhnhauser stated that Shaw
and McKay gave a more detailed analysis of the relationship between disorganization and
8

weakened social control. She mentioned that the mixed model approach that Shaw and
McKay took did lead to lack of clarity and precision in their control theory, however
(Kornhauser, 1978). Therefore, she argued that using social disorganization as purely a
control model would be more efficient.
She proposed that the central proponents of social disorganization (poverty,
residential mobility, and population heterogeneity) resulted in weakened conventional
values, as well as weakened social controls by the community (Kornhauser, 1978)).
These weakened controls could lead to deviant subcultures, associations with delinquent
peers, and persistent deviance in communities. Furthermore, she proposed that these
weakened controls lead to disorganization of culture, as well as structural disorganization
as described by Shaw and McKay (Kornhauser, 1978). This was all reminiscent of
Kasarda’s and Janowitz’s concept of the systemic model of community, which was
rooted in the idea that communities were a complex web of friendship and kindship
networks (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974). Korhnhauser found that economic status, which
she proposed was best measured by economic independence, was the most significant
predictor of higher neighborhood crime rates (Kornhauser, 1978). She also found
ambiguous support for residential mobility and population heterogeneity. Her work
pushed for a more focused approach to social disorganization, giving more attention to
informal and formal networks and social controls.
An alternative approach to rapid expansion of cities and the effects of urbanity
was Fischer’s (1995) work on urbanization and its effect on city communities. He
explained in his earlier works that larger, more populous places develop greater numbers
of subcultures, which led to a more heterogenous population. These subcultures were also
9

more distinct and intense. Fischer proposes that when these groups interact, they
influence each other, which results in unconventional values for both the more prominent
populations, as well as the less prominent ones (Fischer, 1995). Furthermore, Fischer
stated that the larger populations have higher rates of unconventionality in relation to
wider society. In his later works, Fischer addressed issues in the study of urbanism, such
as the object of study, level of analysis, and mediating factors (Fischer, 1995). By
reviewing literature relevant to the effects of urbanism, he found support for subculture
heterogeneity, but discrepancies were found with the intensity of subcultures and the
unconventionality of urban culture (Fischer, 1995). As with early disorganization theory,
a lack of clarity in defining variables, as well as finding data to test them, limited the
study. However, his argument remained that cities and rapidly expanding areas are not
necessarily disorganized, but that they developed different subcultures and abided by
different codes and rules. They were more complex with the combination of different
subcultures, but this did not mean they were disorganized. Rather, that they were
organizing differently.
These networks were then informed by both formal and informal associations
that were tied into further socialization of youth and adolescents. In this view, community
organization was treated as the main factor in community development and closeness in
society (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974). This led to a definition of social disorganization
centered around the idea of communities being unable to realize the different values and
goals of its residents, as well as being unable to maintain social control (Krohn et al.,
2009). These weakened informal controls, as well as the inability for communities to
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meet the needs of its residents (e.g. employment through low-skilled work) was a major
focal point of the current study.
What constituted these informal networks and how they affected social control in
these communities were still largely undefined until theorists such as Sampson and
Bursik began to more clearly define how social disorganization could be measured in
terms of how the community could regulate itself through informal and formal processes
of social control (Krohn et. al, 2009). This furthered social disorganization by
highlighting, as well as more clearly defining, the importance of informal social control
networks. Bursik described how, when Shaw & McKay’s social-disorganization model
and Kasarda’s and Janowitz’s systemic model are combined and used in conjunction, a
common theme emerged. This theme involved structural barriers interfering with certain
communities’ development of formal and informal ties that can hinder their development
of the traits of a socially organized community (solidarity, cohesion, and integration)
(Bursik, 1993). This alluded to the “ability” of communities to enact social control. When
communities are disorganized, ties in the community break down and effectively
diminish the ability of communities to control and enforce norms (Bursik, 1993). In
addition, Bursik illustrated that the definition of what actually constituted a community is
also of importance, as official measures of communities may not apply when residents
describe what counts has “their” community. He showed how this subjectivity was
important (Bursik, 1993).
Sampson, in multiple studies, examined how community characteristics affected
crime and personal victimization. In his 1983 study, Sampson found that structural
density of communities was positively related to rates of robbery and assault
11

victimization, even when controlling for individual level characteristics (Sampson, 1983).
Surprisingly, this effect was stronger for rural areas than urban areas (Sampson, 1983).
Furthermore, in another study (Sampson, 1983), he also found that residential mobility,
high numbers of female-headed households, and structural density were positively
correlated with higher rates of personal victimization. These social integration and
opportunity factors proved to predict victimization better than did individual level
variables.
Sampson and Groves (1989) conducted a more direct test of the mediating factors
of social disorganization theory, such as the ability of the community to supervise and
control teenage peer groups, local friendship ties, and participation in formal and
voluntary activities by the community. Additional factors examined by Sampson and
Groves included marital issues at home, as well as urbanization. The results of this study
supported assumptions of Shaw and McKay’s theory, suggesting that varying amounts of
disorganization between communities display an effect on both criminal victimization
and offending. This study stood as the first direct test of the components and mediating
components of social disorganization theory, rather than just testing its ability to predict
deviance in certain communities (Sampson & Groves, 1989).
Stark furthered this notion of mediating variables by demonstrating how deviant
area characteristics (poverty and residential mobility) and responses to these aspects of
deviance by the community (moral cynicism) can amplify the deviance in an area (Stark,
1987). His 30 propositions showed how these informal and formal aspects are associated
with deviance in socially disorganized areas. An additional study emphasizing the
mediating effects of social disorganization was conducted by Morenoff and colleagues
12

(2001). He showed how social embeddedness, internal social characteristics, and social
organizational processes were important for understanding community level variations in
rates of violence. In particular, spatial proximity to violence, collective efficacy, and
inequality (extreme concentrations on both sides) emerged as predictors of variations in
homicide (Morenoff et. al, 2001).
As social disorganization research evolved, the factors of social capital and
collective efficacy have been shown to have effects on social disorganization in
communities. Some argued that the social ties described by Sampson, Morenoff, and
Bursik are only useful for the potential they have for allowing access to resources,
namely, social capital. Social capital is loosely defined as “intangible resources produced
in ‘relations among persons that facilitate action’ for mutual benefit” (Coleman, 1998,
p.309). The resources gained through social ties are argued to be more important than the
ties themselves for establishing social control. These ties can include ties between
neighboring parents facilitating the sharing of information or resources in the attempt to
better monitor each other’s children. Empirical studies have found support for a negative
relationship between social capital produced through social ties and crime (Rose and
Clear, 1998; Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer, 2001).
Alone, these social ties and capital are not enough to explain residents’ abilities to
tackle issues in the community (Taylor, 2002). Though the web of connections and
resources produced are necessary, they are not enough for purposive action to achieve
social control. For an effective utilization of these factors to occur, a “willingness” to act
must be present, which is only possible when the residents share mutual trust and unity
(Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls, 1999). This is the basis of collective efficacy. Collective
13

efficacy refers to a group’s shared belief and ability to control the actions of both
individuals and groups in a community (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997).
Sampson’s construct of collective efficacy was shown to have a negative effect on rates
of violence in communities in Chicago, even after controlling for other individual-level
characteristics (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). Collective efficacy can still
reduce crime, according to Sampson et al. (1997), even when social ties are low, further
demonstrating the predictive abilities of collective efficacy.
More recently, the role of culture has come into the realm of consideration for
social disorganization theory. Two particular types of cultural approaches are prevalent in
the study of culture and disorganization (Warner, 2003). The first is the study of
subcultures in disorganized communities. This approach looks at a “subculture” of
delinquency (Warner, 2003). Shaw & McKay’s three components (poverty, residential
mobility, and population heterogeneity) are assumed to cause a conflicting subculture to
normative and conventional values in these communities. Works by ethnographers like
Elijah Anderson display the development of these subcultures in disorganized
communities and how they incentivize and legitimize illegal and delinquent behaviors
(Anderson, 1999). The second approach is culture attenuation, or weakening (Warner,
2003). It is not so much that a new type of conflicting subculture arises here, but rather
that conventional values are too weak to serve as effective social control mechanisms in
these communities. The strength of these conventional norms varies and is not strong
enough to serve as a control (Warner, 2003). This idea of culture attenuation evolved
from the words of Korhnhauser, Kasarda, and Sampson, but more clearly stresses the role
of culture.
14

The continuation of social disorganization theory has been supported multiple
times by empirical evidence. This empirical support began anew with Sampson and
Grove’s (1989) study. This study found empirical support for Shaw & McKay’s theory
by testing the effects of local friendship ties, supervision of teenage groups, and low
social participation. These variables were shown to be closely linked with Shaw &
McKay’s three key variables (Sampson & Groves, 1989). Furthermore, Morenoff’s study
of additional mediating factors of social disorganization demonstrated that social
embeddedness, internal social characteristics, and social organizational processes were
important for understanding community level variations in rates of violence (Morenoff et.
al, 2001). In particular, as stated earlier, spatial proximity to violence, collective efficacy,
and inequality emerged as predictors of variations in homicide. In regards to the cultural
aspects, Warner also explored the role of attenuated culture in her study (Warner, 2003).
Her results demonstrated that a majority of neighbors in the communities agreed with
conventional values, though the communities still have high poverty and drug use.
However, she also displayed that residents underestimated how much those surrounding
them believed in the same values (Warner, 2003). These notions of shared beliefs also
suggested that social ties are important because they provide a mechanism where shared
values can be recognized. These studies have all been important in providing empirical
support for the continued studying and improving of social disorganization theory.
More recent applications of Social Disorganization theory have demonstrated the
flexibility of the theory, and how it can be used in conjunction with other theories to
provide more nuanced explanations of crime in different settings. Ravalin and Tevis
(2016) used a social disorganization paradigm to analyze crime on California community
15

college campuses. Studying the relationship between social structure elements,
organizational elements, and criminal activity, they found a positive relationship between
personal and property crime, and the number of students receiving Pell Grants.
Furthermore, the ability of social disorganization to be used in conjunction with other
theories provides further evidence of the theory’s utility.
The ability of Social Disorganization theory to be utilized with other theories and
used in multiple settings has allowed it to inform potential policy considerations. A paper
utilizing social disorganization propositions, alongside reintegrative shaming ideas,
showed the potential of peacemaking criminology and restorative justice (Warner, Beck,
and Ohmer, 2010). The policy implications that can be informed by Social
Disorganization Theory’s focus on informal social controls and collective efficacy can be
important for moving crime control past the extremely punitive route it is currently on.
Given the link made between crime, population turnover, and population heterogeneity, it
is easy to see why Social Disorganization Theory and immigration have been so closely
linked.
Immigration Reform
America’s history is one woven with immigration and conflicts around
immigration. From the conflicts with American indigenous people caused by the settling
of the Puritans that founded the 13 colonies to current day battles over borders, issues
concerning immigration have been a consistent topic of controversy. Prior to World War
I, examples of American immigration reform can be seen in the Chinese Exclusion Act,
as well as the Gentleman’s Agreement with Japan (Guerin-Gonzales, 1994). Both of
these acts restricted immigration from countries that supplied traditional migrant workers
16

in both railroad and agriculture industries. Following World War I, the Immigration Acts
of both 1921 and 1924 placed quota systems on the number of immigrants that could
come in from certain countries. However, due to the fact that seaports were much easier
to regulate than land-based entryways, Latino immigration was not nearly as regulated as
immigrants from other counties without land-based access to the United States
(Ngai,1999). This incentivized American labor markets to turn to these migrant workers
to supply labor that was now missing due to the decrease of other labor-based immigrant
groups. This marked one of the first major influxes of Latino immigrants in the United
States, and led to substantial increase in the number of Latino workers in the country
(Ngai, 1999).
World War II marked another important milestone for Latino migrant workers. As
many of America’s native-born workers were drafted to fight in the war, a large hole was
left in the labor market that had to be filled. This created many opportunities for new
immigrants to find employment. Even the government became involved in this, as the
Bracero Accords of 1942 reveal (Craig, 1971). These accords brought Latino workers to
America under government supervision, promising them wages, living quarters, and
choice to return to Mexico once their work was done (Garcia, 2002). This program’s
success lasted beyond the war until 1964 (Calavita, 1992) and provided work to nearly
4.8 million Latino immigrants (Cerrutti and Massey, 2006). Once this program ended,
many labor markets still continued to use these workers, whether or not they were
documented. The continued use of migrant workers, coupled with the demand for
unskilled labor that lasted until the 1970s and 1980s, fueled the number of undocumented
immigrants in America that is still seen today.
17

Policies surrounding Latino migrant workers have been characterized by
discrepancies in regard to degrees of border control and attitudes, which has been
associated with both increased numbers of Latinos in America, as well as diversity in
regards to where they reside (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2003; Litcher, 2012). Prior to
1986, the trends of Latino immigration were largely a revolving door (Durand & Massey,
2006). Workers would come from Mexico to the United States (usually California and
Texas), work, make money, and return to Mexico. However, border enforcing measures
such as Operation Blockade and Operation Gatekeeper, in addition to legalizing programs
like the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of the Reagan administration,
drastically hindered legal avenues for migrant Latino workers to enter the United States,
and deterred now legalized Latino workers from leaving for fear of being unable to return
to America (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2003). Consequently, the number of Latino
immigrants increased from 14.5 million in 1980 to 50.5 million in 2012 (Ramirez & De
la Cruz, 2002; Lichter, 2012). As a result, Latinos now rank as the largest minority in the
country (U.S. Census Bureau-PIO, 2010). This resulted in a major increase of low-skilled
migrant workers in an already shrinking low-skilled labor market.
An additional consequence of these recent immigration reforms is the movement
of Latino workers from traditional immigration destinations, mostly California and
Texas, to newer areas in America (Durrand et. al, 2000). Many of these new immigration
destinations were rural areas, a fact discussed in more detail below. Proposition 187 was
an example of legislation enacted that incentivized racism and hostile attitudes towards
Latinos (Calavita, 1996). This proposition resulted in a crackdown on illegal immigrants,
companies hiring illegal immigrants, and people supplying forged official documents to
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them. Though many of this provision’s tenets were not upheld in court, the message
became clear that these workers were not welcomed, and caused an exodus of many
Latino workers to new areas. This, plus the increase of opportunities in other parts of the
country, lured these migrant workers to new destinations (Krissman, 2000; Kandel and
Cromartie, 2004).
Latino migrant workers were met with similar opposition in these new
destinations, however, and also began to experience new hardships. Flores (2015)
illustrated how anti-immigrant narratives, coded language, and public polices kindled
public anxiety over the newly arriving workers that mirrored those displayed in
California. Laws allowing local enforcement of federal laws, discrimination against nonEnglish speakers, and fines for employers hiring undocumented workers further
established this narrative of an unwelcoming attitude towards Latino migrant workers
(Flores, 2015).
In addition to natives associating Latino immigrants with social disorder, these
new immigration destinations began to have effects on the migrant population. Migrant
workers had established community structures to help foster ties and bonds in traditional
immigration areas. This influenced what has been referred to as a “Latino Paradox”
(Kochhar, 2008). The Latino Paradox is where Latinos, a disadvantaged, minority group,
actually have lower crime rates than would be expected considering their position.
However, these new destinations lacked those social structures found in their original
destinations. The lack of those structures, in conjunction with a hostile native disposition
towards these workers and lack of integration of this newly, rapidly expanding
population, fostered social disorganization within the Latino migrant community (Leach
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and Bean, 2008). The combination of these factors was associated with increased Latino
victimization in these new destinations (Shihadeh and Barranco, 2013).
Though the stereotype that Latino immigrants are naturally criminal has persisted
in society through the past century, there has been no consistent empirical evidence to
support this notion. Some studies have found a positive correlation between Latino
immigration and crime (e.g. O’Kane, 1992; Tanton and Lutton, 1993), but may others
have suggested just the opposite (e.g. Butcher and Piehl, 1998; Borjas, Grogger, and
Hanson, 2006), with higher Latino immigration associated with lower crimes rates. The
idea that immigration increases crime has been mostly disavowed in academic work
(Martinez and Lee, 1998), and some studies have gone as far as to say that Latino
immigration actually decreases crime (Sampson, 2006). In fact, crime drastically
decreased in the U.S. during the 1990s, which is the same time that Latino immigration
increased so rapidly. Though this seemed contrary to early disorganization propositions,
the complex web of social ties created by the immersion of newly arriving immigrants in
traditional destination certainly abides by more nuanced principles set forth by social
disorganization theorists. However, more recent research has suggested that an indirect
relationship between Latino immigration and crime exists through the competition for
low-skilled jobs in communities.
Low-Skill Job Competition
An additional consequence associated with the militarized border control, apart
from the increased Latino population, is the increased competition in the low-skilled job
market. This competition can be seen affecting labor markets in both rural and urban
areas alike, though for slightly different reasons. Urban blacks and rural whites
20

particularly felt the effects of low-skilled job competition associated with immigration
reform (Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010a; Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010d). Despite the
immense cultural contributions that Latino immigrants have made, ignoring the effect
caused to the labor market by employers heavily recruiting low-skill Latino workers
would be ignoring a significant factor in the shaping of both rural and urban employment
patterns.
Urban Labor Market Changes
The Civil Rights movement was a defining moment for blacks in America. The
legal and cultural changes brought by the Civil Rights movement provided numerous
avenues for the lives and positions of many blacks to improve. However, the effects were
not felt evenly across the black community. Both pre-WWII urban and rural job markets
were characterized by a plentiful supply of low-skilled jobs (Kasarda, 1993). For urban
areas, these jobs were primarily in construction and manufacturing. However, due to the
loss of these jobs because of deindustrialization, these low-skill jobs became less
available, further exacerbating the degree of poverty and disorganization in inner-city
communities (Kasarda, 1993). The jobs that did remain began to move out of the innercity to suburban areas. These jobs were then replaced by white collar jobs that the
residents of these comminutes lacked the education and skills to attain. As a result,
poverty and unemployment in urban areas continued to expand (Kasarda, 1993).
Disorganization in black, inner city communities was not only a result of a lack of
jobs in the post-WWII deindustrializing era, but was also affected by racist attitudes and
the mobility of successful blacks from these inner-city communities and the population
turnover that it caused (Wilson, 1987). Mobility of successful blacks from these
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communities removed many essential role models for younger members of the
communities, as well as more established community leaders who allowed for some
degree of integration with the white community. This disrupted the social web that
affected social control in the community, further increasing the degree of disorganization
that fostered crime (Shihadeh & Flynn, 1996; Krivo & Petterson, 2000).
Furthermore, racist policies in employment, housing, and the criminal justice
system contributed to these disorganized communities. Black populations in America
already suffered due to a long-shared history of racial violence and prejudice. Though
laws changed in the wake of the Civil Rights era, many policies and structures still
remained that hindered equal opportunities for blacks. As seen in Alexander’s (2010) The
New Jim Crow, the War on Drugs, and its emphasis on “law and order”, created an
atmosphere that facilitated already existing racial barriers that made finding decent
employment nearly impossible for impoverished African Americans. Mass incarceration,
and the image of the “criminal blackman” became increasingly influential, and further
isolated black communities (Young, 2006). These events created severely segregated,
racially homogeneous communities, and, along with poverty and residential mobility,
display the effects of social disorganization.
Rural Labor Market Changes
The effect of the loss of low-skill jobs, though not as well documented, was even
worse for rural areas in America. Though urban and rural job markets are similar in many
aspects, rural America is characterized by a heavy reliance on low-skilled jobs (Gibbs et
al, 2004). Additionally, compared to urban areas, rural job markets lost low-skilled jobs
at a faster rate than did urban ones (Gibbs et al, 2005). Filteau (2015) found that labor
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market changes had effects that spread widely in rural communities. He found that as the
labor market in rural areas changes, so do constructions of masculinity in the labor
market. Jobs that were considered feminine during earlier economic periods were
considered masculine when previous avenues became unavailable (Filteau, 2015).
Few studies have examined the relationship between rural economic conditions
and crime, but those that have been conducted have found implications between
economic conditions and criminal activity (e.g., Kposowa & Breault 1993; Kposowa et
al. 1995; Lee et al. 2003; Lee and Stevenson 2006). Kposowa & Breault (1993) found
that the results based on studies of urban areas were not generalizable to the all areas of
the U.S. However, support was found for economic deprivation, subculture of violence
perspectives, and social disorganization. Later, Kposowa et al. (1995) found that certain
structural factors were able to predict different kinds of crime. Poverty, population
density, and divorce were found to be predictors of higher rates of homicide in rural
counties. Economic deprivation and urbanity predicted higher rates of property and
violent crime (Kpsowa et al., 1995). Lee et al. (2003) conducted a study that showed
socioeconomic disadvantage had a significant impact on homicide rates in rural areas.
Lee & Stevenson (2006) found that gender-specific measures of poverty, unemployment,
and female-headed households did not predict higher female crime, but that these same
variables, when gender-specified for men, did predict higher rates of homicide by men
(Lee et al., 2003).
This relationship was similar to that found in urban settings, though the
implication remained larger for rural areas due to the heavier reliance on low-skilled jobs
(42.2% of all jobs in 2000 for rural areas versus 34% in urban areas) (Gibbs et al, 2004).
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This reliance, like urban areas, has a heavy bearing on the structure of the community.
The composition of the labor market does vary within rural communities, however.
Though many rural areas lost jobs that focused on resource extraction and farming, others
were able to survive off of tourism industries and the oil market (Brown & Swanson,
2003). Variances in rural communities are also visible in relation to their racial dynamics.
Though long held conceptions of rural America being mostly white have persisted, the
truth is variances exist between different areas of rural America (Lichter, 2012). Between
Indian reservations and the “black belt” in the South, it becomes clear that the racial
makeup of rural areas is not homogenous. Though some areas are whiter, the location of
a community can have important implications for its racial dynamics (Lichter, 2012).
This relationship becomes more complex when the relationship between Latino lowskilled workers and rural agricultural jobs is taken into account.
Latino Competition for Low-Skill Jobs
Tied to the issues of this dwindling supply of jobs requiring limited technical
skills in rural and urban areas is the influx of low-skilled Latino workers who essentially
became trapped in the U.S. due to the unintended effects of stricter immigration laws.
After return to Mexico became too risky for many of these migrant workers, remaining in
low-skilled work in the U.S. became the only avenue for many. Latinos successfully
competed for low-skilled jobs for a number of reasons. The youthful age distribution of
many of these immigrants made them prime candidates for the difficult physical labor of
manufacturing and agriculture. Additionally, low educational attainment by most made
keeping Latino workers’ wages low a simpler process for employers (Aponte, 1996).
Furthermore, a majority of Latino immigrants held a much lower reserve wage than their
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black and white counterparts (Wilson, 1996). These factors increased their attractiveness
to employers. These aspects are further complicated by potential legality statuses for
many Latino low-skilled workers, which effectively eliminate a large amount of
negotiating power for the workers. Latinos also had access to a racialized labor market,
where many employers equated Latino ethnicity with a better work ethic and ability to
perform the duties required more efficiently (Waldinger,1997; Johnson-Webb, 2002). For
these reasons, and more, employers, especially rural employers, heavily recruited Latino
workers (Kandel, 2006). When it came to “traditional” immigration destinations, Latinos
could use their dense web of social connections to find employment (Fernandez-Kelley &
Patricia, 1995; Aguilera and Massey, 2003). Utilizing these connections has been shown
to work for Latinos seeking work from both immigrant and non-immigrant owned
businesses.
The overall growth of the Latino population is related to issues for rural and urban
America alike. The already existing structural inequalities that were in place for African
Americans, coupled with the dwindling availability of low-skill jobs, made finding
suitable employment arduous for urban blacks. However, when the task of competing
with migrant Latino workers is added to the mix, this further exacerbated the structural
issues pertaining to poverty and crime in these communities. Shihadeh and Barranco
(2010a) found that Latino immigration was positively correlated with black violence in
urban areas. The increase in violence was attributed to an increase in black
unemployment caused by losing ground to Latinos in the low-skill job market. (Barranco,
2014).
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In rural settings, low-skill job competition was just as important. Compared to the
low-skill labor market in urban settings, which is primarily composed of black workers,
rural low-skill workers are primarily non-black (Gibbs et al., 2004). Additionally, rural
immigration growth outpaced the rate of immigration growth in urban areas. This was
especially true for the South, Midwest, and Northeast (Saenz & Torres, 2003). In fact,
25% of all non-metropolitan growth from 1990-2000 was comprised of Latinos in these
areas (Lichter & Johnson, 2006). Because the influx of Latino migration to rural areas
was primarily job focused, increases in the Latino population occurred mostly in rural
areas where low-skilled jobs in agriculture and meat packing were prevalent. The
increased rural Latino population resulted in similar type of competition for non-black
rural workers that it did for urban blacks. Competition was further increased due to the
heavy recruitment being conducted by rural employers. Shihadeh and Barranco (2010d)
found that, when low-skilled job markets shifted to Latinos in rural areas, violence
increased for non-Latino whites. However, it did not increase for blacks in these areas.
The increase of crime in these areas displayed the socially disorganizing effects of lowskill job competition. Previous research examining low-skill labor markets and crime
have focused on how the disorganizing effects of unemployment have increased violence.
However, I believe the relationship between disorganization, job loss, and crime is more
complex and this relationship may vary depending on the types of crime, as suggested
below.
Ability of Communities to Selectively Control
Though the effects of social disorganization in communities has been shown to be
detrimental, the relationship between disorganization and crime may be more complex
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than previously thought. When communities become socially disorganized, the citizens
“become preoccupied with their difficulties, the residents…are simultaneously ineffective
parents and apathetic citizens. The larger the concentration of distracted persons in a
community, the less capable the community becomes for united resistance to anything –
including crime.” (Toby, 1957, p.13). However, prior literature suggests that even
socially disorganized communities may be able, or willing, to enforce certain norms more
than others. Furst et al (1999) found that a decrease in youth cocaine use in the New York
was tied to the stigmatizing image of the “crack head” placed by both media and the
community (Furst et. al, 1999). Similarly, Friedman et. al (2007) found that the
stigmatizing influence of certain New York communities enacted a certain control over
drug users to “keep it together”, and either hide their drug use, or avoid using it entirely
around the other residents of a community. Thus, even disorganized communities were
able to increase the amount of social control it exerted over certain undesirable behaviors,
suggesting that these communities may not be as disorganized as previously thought.
This ability to selectively increase social controls suggests that perhaps a different type of
organization has occurred.
In contrast, some communities may be more willing to allow certain undesirable
behaviors if they benefit certain parts of the community. For instance, research on inner
city crime has shown that perceptions of drug dealing in communities is not always
negative because of the financial associations that are tied with them. In Anderson’s
(1999) Code of the Street, dealers often had the respect of some residents because of the
perceived lack of legitimate opportunities available to make money. Alexander (2010)
discusses similar notions in The New Jim Crow, where she argues that it is widely
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understood in disorganized communities that the lack of legal avenues for income as a
result of mass incarceration leaves many with little choice but to turn to dealing. It
becomes possible, then, that communities are more willing to enforce norms when it
comes to expressive type crimes like drug using (as seen with the “crack head” stigma),
but are more lenient when it comes to financially motivated, instrumental actions like
drug dealing when legal avenues to making money are blocked.
The predictions of the current study are similar to those of Merton’s Deviance
Typology. Robert K. Merton, in his development of Social Strain Theory, argued that
certain social structures and conditions may pressure citizens to engage in criminal
activity (Merton, 1938). These strains can be structural or individual in nature, but the
overall effect is people are pressured to perform or engage in criminal activity. Within
this theory, Merton discusses a typology of deviance that delineates a relationship
between the goals of society, a person’s acceptance of those goals, society’s prescribed
means to attain those goals, and a person’s belief in the legitimacy of those means
(Merton, 1938). According to this paradigm, a person can fall into one of four categories
(conformist, innovator, ritualist, retreatist, or rebel).
If a person accepts both society’s goals and the means to attain them, they are a
conformist (Merton, 1938). Alternatively, accepting only the goals, but not the means
places them in the category of an innovator. When a person does not accept the goals, but
goes along with the means, they are categorized as a ritualist (Merton, 1938). If a person
accepts neither the goals nor the means, they are retreatists. The last category, like
retreatism, describes someone who accepts neither the goals or means of society (Merton,
1938). However, unlike retreatism, rebellion includes replacing the goals and means of
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society with a person’s own. This typology can be applied to this study because,
according to the hypotheses, community members would be accepting of both
conformist, ritualists, and innovators. Drug manufacturing and distribution would fall
under the category of innovator, due to the fact that these people are still aspiring to make
money (i.e. accepting society’s goals), but not by society’s prescribed means. However,
according to the hypotheses, communities would not accept rebellion, such as murder or
rape.

29

CHAPTER III
CURRENT STUDY

The current study investigates this idea by examining how the loss of low-skilled
jobs affects drug distribution and manufacturing and drug possession in communities.
Drug possession may or may not negatively impact a community, but few would argue
that it is beneficial. Depending on the financial and labor market situations of certain
communities, drug distribution and manufacturing could be seen as a way to make
income when legitimate avenues are scarce – for both individuals and different segments
of the community. Though drug distribution and manufacturing may not normally be
tolerated in a community, if the disorganizing effects of job loss make legal avenues
scarce, then communities may decrease their willingness to use informal controls in
relation to financially motivated crimes like this one. However, because drug possession
itself does not bring in income to the community, and cannot be viewed as beneficial to
the community, it would not seem likely that communities, even socially disorganized
ones, would not enforce norms related to stigmatizing and shaming drug possession. This
notion can be furthered tested by comparing instrumental crimes and expressive crimes in
general.
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Expressive crimes are often argument-based and lack a financial motivation.
Examples include rape, murder (not in the course of a robbery), and aggravated assault.
Instrumental crimes, on the other hand, are defined as those crimes by which the primary
motivation is to bring financial gain to the offender. Examples include robbery, larcenytheft, motor vehicle theft, and many white-collar crimes. The prevalence of these types of
crime may vary according to the cause of social disorganization in the community. If the
cause of disorganization is economically based, as is the case with low-skilled job
competition, then perhaps instrumental crimes would be more likely to occur. Lastly, due
to the differences in rural and urban labor markets, as well as differences in crime rates,
the effects of disorganization on rural and urban communities will be compared.
Hypotheses
Based on my review of the literature, I have developed the following expectations:
Hypothesis 1: Low-skill market shifts in Latinos’ favor will have a larger, positive effect
on drug distribution and manufacturing crimes than on drug possession.
Hypothesis 2: Low-skill market shifts in Latinos’ favor will have a lager, positive effect
on instrumental crimes than on expressive crimes.
Hypothesis 3: The effect of the loss of low-skill labor on crime will be positive and have
a stronger, positive effect for rural whites than rural blacks. This idea is derived from the
research done by Shihadeh and Barranco (2010d).
Hypothesis 4: The effect of the loss of low-skill labor on crime will be positive and have
a stronger, positive effect for urban blacks than urban whites. This idea is derived from
the research done by Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a).
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Methods
In order to analyze the questions presented above, data will be used to measure
aspects of social disorganization theory at the community level, competition for low-skill
jobs between Latinos and non-Latinos, as well as instrumental and expressive type
crimes. To conduct these analyses, I used data from counties in the U.S. with at least
1000 Latinos, 1000 blacks, and 1000 whites, and for which there was racially
disaggregated arrest data available for 2009, 2010, 2011. These population cutoffs insure
there are enough cases to calculate the racially disaggregated variables described below.
This resulted in 886 counties for the study.
The dependent variables for this study will be drawn from the 2009, 2010, and
2011 Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data (UCR). The UCR categorizes arrests by
factors such as age, sex and race and is summarized yearly for counties in the United
States.
Dependent Variable
The first set of dependent variables will be race-specific arrest rates for
sale/manufacturing of drugs in each county (Black Drug Manufacturing and Distribution,
White Drug Manufacturing and Distribution). Each rate was a 3-year average from 20092011 and was race specific. The formula for each dependent variable was the sum
number of arrests, either blacks or white, depending on the variable, from 2009, 2010,
and 2011 in each county. This number was then divided by the county population in 2010
and multiplied by 100,000. The formula is the same for the rest of the dependent
variables. The second variable will be race-specific arrest rates for possession of drugs in
each county (Black Drug Possession, White Drug Possession). Furthermore, a variable
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will be created for race-specific arrests rates of instrumental crimes (robbery, burglary,
larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft,) (Black Instrumental Crimes, White Instrumental
Crimes) and race-specific expressive crimes (murder, assault, and rape) (Black
Expressive Crimes, White Expressive Crimes). Due to the skewness of theses crime rates,
all models were run using the logged rate of each dependent variable.
Independent Variables
The independent variables described below have been used in previous studies
looking at the relationship between crime and low skill job competition associated with
Latino immigration (Shihedah & Barranco, 2010a; Shihedah & Barranco, 2010b) and
were obtained/calculated using the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year
estimates. The ACS is a survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau and contains data
pertaining to content such as ancestry, income, educational gains, immigration and
migration, employment, and language proficiency. The purpose of these data is to
determine funding distribution and track shifting demographics by public and private
sector organizations.
The first key explanatory variable measures Latino immigration. This is the
proportion of Latinos living in a county who were not born in the United States (Latino
Immigration). This does not include undocumented immigrants. I found no defensible
algorithm for making inter-county adjustments, so no adjustments were made to adjust
for this. Furthermore, existing estimates of undocumented immigrants are rough at best,
and are usually only national level, which are of little use for county level estimate. The
formula used for calculating Latino immigration was the number of foreign born Latinos
in each county divided by the total number of Latinos in each county.
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Another key explanatory variable represents the racial composition of the low
skill job market in counties. To determine whether an industry was considered lowskilled or not, I used the Career Guide to Industries (CGI) of the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2006) to identify industries where more than 50% of the individuals (age 25
and over) working in that sector lacked a high-school diploma. The CGI is a survey of
businesses that complies information about the nature of the industry, working
conditions, job outlook, and training/education involved for various industries. The
resulting low-skilled sectors are (1) agriculture, (2) forestry, (3) fishing, (4) mining, (5)
construction, (6) manufacturing, (7) transportation, (8) retail trade, (9) accommodation
and food serves, (10) other services, and (11) waste management. To represent a shift in
the labor market in favor of Latinos, I calculated the change in the proportion of all lowskilled jobs held by Latinos, in each county, from 2000 to 2010 (Change in Proportion of
Latinos in Low-Skilled Jobs). The formula used to do this required dividing the number
of Latinos in low-skill jobs in each county by the total number of low-skill jobs in each
county. This was done for both 2000 and 2010. The 2000 number was then subtracted
from the 2010 number to obtain the figure. The additional data required to make this
calculation came from Summary File 4 of the 2000 Census. Values above one show a
shift in favor of Latinos, while negative values reveal the opposite result.
Control Variables
To control for the number of Latinos in the counties being used, a variable was
created that included the proportions of county’s population that is Latino (Pro Latino).
This helped control for the overall presence of Latinos while examining low-skill change.
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This variable was calculated by dividing the Latino population in each county by the total
population in each county.
Given the link between family and economic hardships, residential instability, and
crime, variables representing economic hardships and residential instability were created.
Independent variables included: Proportion of blacks with less than a high school
diploma (Black Less than Highschool), proportion of black unemployed (Black
Unemployment), proportion of black single-head households (Black Single Headed
Households), and proportion of blacks in poverty (Black Poverty). The proportion of
blacks with less than a high school diploma variable was calculated by dividing the
number of blacks in a county who had less than a high school diploma by the total
number of blacks in a county. The black unemployment variable was calculated by
dividing the number of blacks who are unemployed in a county by the total number of
blacks in a county. The black single-headed household variable was calculated by
dividing the number of black single headed households in a county by the total number of
black households in a county. Lastly, the black poverty variable was calculated by
dividing the number of blacks in poverty by the total number of blacks in a county. These
four variables were converted to Z-scores, then summed to provide an overall measure of
black economic disadvantage (Black Disadvantage). Additionally, white economic
disadvantage was measured by number of whites with less than a high school diploma
(White Less Than Highschool), white unemployment (White Unemployment), white
single-headed households (White Single Headed Household), and whites in poverty
(White Poverty). The same formulas were used for whites as was for blacks, except for
the white population. These four variables were also converted to Z scores, then summed
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to provide an overall measure of white economic disadvantage (White Disadvantage).
Black and white median age variables were used to control for the age-crime relationship
(Black Age, White Age).
As measures of Social Disorganization, I controlled for the proportion of residents
who had moved in the past year (Moved), and the proportion of vacant houses in the
county (Vacant Houses). This variable was calculated by dividing the number of
residents in a county who lived in a different county a year ago by the total number of
people in a county. The variable was calculated by dividing the total number of vacant
houses in a county by the total number of houses in a county. Housing density was
included to measure the density of the population (Housing Density). This variable was
calculated by dividing the number of housing units in clusters of 5 or more in a county by
the total number of housing units in a county. This increases the opportunity for
interpersonal violence as well as the ability to sell drugs. The total population of the
country was also measured (Total Population). To further control for the racial/ethnic
composition of the counties, the proportion of the community that was black was
measured as well (Pro Black). This variable was calculated by dividing the number of
blacks in a county by the total population in a county. Lastly, for each county, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) Rural-Urban Continuum Code was used to create
variables for metropolitan and non-metropolitan counties. This coding scheme by the
USDA classifies counties into metropolitan counties based on population size, and nonmetropolitan counties based on levels of urbanization and whether or not it is adjacent to
a metropolitan county. Metropolitan counties represented urban counties whilst nonmetropolitan counties represented rural counties (Metro).
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

The descriptive statistics for the models are reported in Tables 1, 2, and 3. For
descriptive purposes, both the white and black disadvantage variables were split into the
four variables that composed them (Poverty, Less Than a High School Diploma,
Unemployment, and Number of Single Headed Households). The descriptives are divided
into all counties used in model in Table 1, metropolitan counties in Table 2, and nonmetropolitan counties in Table 3. This serves the purposes of comparing rural and urban
counties used in the model. There were no discernable differences between rural and
urban counties for the mean change in proportion of Latinos in low-skill jobs variable.
There were discernable differences between rural and urban counties for other
variables, however. Both instrumental and expressive crimes saw differences for both
blacks and whites in rural and urban counties. For blacks, instrumental crimes saw a
mean rate of 5641.23 in urban counties, but this mean dropped to 4005.14 in rural
counties. The same is true for black expressive crimes, with a change of 1462.52 to
1255.17. The same is true for whites. For instrumental crimes, whites saw a mean rate of
1731.17 in urban counties, compared to 1489.89 in rural counties. For expressive crimes,
whites saw a mean rate of 392.43 in urban counties, and a rate of 362.12 in rural counties
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Differences were noted between rural and urban counties in regard to blacks and whites.
Rural counties saw a higher proportion of blacks in poverty, as well as blacks with no
high school diploma. These two are quite possibly connected, as the same relationship
exists for whites. In rural counties, there are higher proportions of impoverished whites,
as well as whites without a high school diploma. The last major difference between rural
and urban counties pertains to total population and population density. The mean
population was much higher for urban counties; the mean housing density was also
higher.
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Table 1

Descriptive Statistics of County-level Variables for 886 U.S. Counties, 2010
Mean

S.D.

Minimum

Maximum

Black Instrumental Crimes

5236.89

3730.37

0

33470.24

Black Expressive Crimes

1414.55

1147.48

30.59

8378.14

Black Drug Manufacturing/Distribution

1077.57

1232.15

0

12267.32

Black Drug Possession

3461.92

2447.89

2.02

18495.4

White Instrumental Crimes

1671.54

1472.30

10.76

25629.67

White Expressive Crimes

385.42

458.52

2.57

5709.18

White Drug Manufacturing/Distribution

209.27

244.498

0

3321.56

White Drug Possession

1229.31

1434.42

0

24765.5

White Age

41.16

4.49

22.4

64.2

Black Age

31.99

4.76

12.7

68.4

.35

.15

.05

.80

263,030

516,621

8332

9758256

Metro

.75

.43

0

1

Housing Density

.12

.08

.003

.95

Vacant Houses

.12

.06

.02

.54

Moved

.08

.04

.02

.46

White Single Headed Households

.08

.02

.02

.15

White No Highschool

.12

.05

.01

.30

White Poverty

.10

.04

.02

.33

White Unemployment

.07

.02

.02

.15

Black Single Headed Households

.24

.08

0

.78

Black No Highschool

.20

.09

0

.50

Black Poverty

.27

.11

.03

.78

Black Unemployment

.13

.06

0

.61

Pro Latino

.11

.12

.01

.90

Pro Black

.13

.13

.003

.79

Change in Proportion of Latinos in Low-Skill Jobs

.04

.03

-.09

.33

Latino Immigration
Total Population

39

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics of County-level Variables for 666 Metropolitan U.S.
Counties, 2010
Mean

S.D.

Minimum

Maximum

Black Instrumental Crimes

5641.23

3974.07

0

33470.23

Black Expressive Crimes

1462.52

1192.57

30.59

8378.14

Black Drug Manufacturing/Distribution

1119.30

1269.86

0

12267.32

Black Drug Possession

3595.23

2477.50

2.02

18495.4

White Instrumental Crimes

1731.17

1636.63

10.76

25629.67

White Expressive Crimes

392.43

502.84

2.57

5709.181

White Drug Manufacturing/Distribution

215.98

264.46

0

3321.56

White Drug Possession

1275.37

1593.47

0

24765.5

White Age

40.72

4.49

22.4

64.2

Black Age

31.57

4.43

12.7

48.4

.35

.14

.05

.68

332,307

578,637

11702

9758256

Metro

---

---

--

--

Housing Density

.13

.09

.01

.96

Vacant Houses

.11

.06

.02

.54

Moved

.07

.03

.02

.46

White Single Headed Households

.08

.02

.02

.15

White No Highschool

.10

.04

.01

.28

White Poverty

.10

.04

.02

.33

White Unemployment

.06

.02

.02

.15

Black Single Headed Households

.24

.07

0

.77

Black No Highschool

.18

.08

0

.46

Black Poverty

.26

.10

.03

.77

Black Unemployment

.13

.05

0

.38

Pro Latino

.11

.13

.01

.90

Pro Black

.12

.13

.003

.79

Change in Proportion of Latinos in Low-Skill Jobs

.04

.03

-.05

.33

Latino Immigration
Total Population
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Table 3

Descriptive Statistics of County-level Variables for 220 Nonmetropolitan
U.S. Counties, 2010
Mean

S.D.

Minimum

Maximum

Black Instrumental Crimes

4005.14

2493.64

113.98

16583.75

Black Expressive Crimes

1255.17

968.74

58.57

7765.67

Black Drug Manufacturing/Distribution

950.47

1102.46

0

10695.19

Black Drug Possession

3060.80

2316.00

61.12

12872.78

White Instrumental Crimes

1489.89

756.65

89.82

4108.28

White Expressive Crimes

362.12

261.77

15.38

1601.50

White Drug Manufacturing/Distribution

188.84

168.68

0

1116.46

White Drug Possession

1090.73

766.58

0

4372.24

White Age

42.49

4.23

26

52.2

Black Age

33.29

5.45

19.5

47.1

.37

.16

.06

.80

51,736

27,116

8332

189916

Metro

---

---

--

--

Housing Density

.06

.03

.004

.22

Vacant Houses

.16

.07

.06

.80

Moved

.07

.04

.02

.32

White Single Headed Households

.09

.02

.04

.13

White No Highschool

.16

.05

.05

.30

White Poverty

.13

.04

.04

.29

White Unemployment

.07

.02

.02

.13

Black Single Headed Households

.24

.10

0

.78

Black No Highschool

.27

.08

.01

.50

Black Poverty

.32

.11

.05

.78

Black Unemployment

.14

.07

0

.61

Pro Latino

.10

.11

.01

.56

Pro Black

.14

.13

.01

.62

Change in Proportion of Latinos in Low-Skill Jobs

.03

.03

-.09

.14

Latino Immigration
Total Population
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The findings from an OLS regression predicting instrumental criminal offenses,
expressive criminal offenses, drug manufacturing and distribution offenses, and drug
possession offenses for whites in the counties analyzed are presented in Table 4. Model 1
predicted instrumental offenses and showed that the change in the proportion of low-skill
jobs held by Latinos had no significant effect on white instrumental crime rate. Similarly,
Model 2, which predicted expressive crimes, showed no significant relationship between
the change in the proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and expressive crimes rates
committed by whites. However, Model 3, which predicted drug manufacturing and
distribution crimes, did find a significant, positive relationship (3.26) between the change
in the proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and the rate of drug manufacturing and
distribution committed by whites. This means as the low-skill labor market shifted in
favor of Latinos, whites experienced higher drug manufacturing and distribution arrest
rates. Model 4 predicted drug possession crimes and displayed similar findings with a
significant, positive relationship (3.78) occurring between the change of proportion of
low-skill jobs held by Latinos and drug possession rates of whites. This means the more
the low-skill labor market shifted in favor of Latinos, whites experienced higher drug
possession arrest rates. However, contrary to the original hypotheses, beta coefficients
revealed that the effect of the change in the proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos
was stronger for drug possession (0.15), than it was for drug manufacturing and
distribution (0.10). In sum, neither instrumental nor expressive crimes were significantly
affected by changes in the proportion of Latinos in the low-skill labor market. Drug
manufacturing and distribution, as well as drug possession crimes were, but not in the
way the original hypothesis predicted.
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Further information was derived from the control variables used in this study.
Total population was significantly, positively correlated with higher rates of both white
instrumental crime rates, as well as white expressive crime rates. Furthermore, percentage
of people who have moved in the past year was also significantly, positively correlated
with higher rates of both white instrumental crime rates and white expressive crime rates.
Vacant houses were only significantly correlated with white drug possession. This
relationship was positive. White disadvantage was significant and positively correlated
with both white instrumental and expressive crime rates, as well as white drug
manufacturing/distribution crime rates. The proportion of a county’s population who
were Latino was also significantly, positively correlated with white instrumental and
expressive crime rates, as well as white drug manufacturing/ distribution and drug
possession crime rates.
Housing density, however, was significantly, and negatively correlated with white
instrumental crime rates and white expressive crime rates. This negative relationship is
also present with the proportion of a county’s residents who are black. This relationship
was significantly, negatively correlated with both white instrumental and expressive
crimes rates, as well as white drug manufacturing/distribution and drug possession rates.
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Table 4

Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates Predicting Logged White
Crime Rates in U.S. Counties, 2010

White
Instrumental
Crimes
Model 1
Total
Population#
Moved

White
Expressive
Crimes
Model 2

White
Drug
Manufacturing
and Distribution
Model 3

White
Drug
Possession
Model 4

7.06***
(0.96)
4.64**
(0.04)
-0.49
(0.01)
-5.66***
(0.12)
0.001
(0.001)
-1.71***
(0.06)
0.098***
(0.08)
0.15
(0.02)
-2.64
(0.02)

5.29***
(0.95)
4.22**
(0.05)
-0.63
(0.01)
-4.40***
(0.12)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.97**
(0.04)
0.09***
(0.09)
0.03
(0.004)
-1.03
(0.01)

1.12
(0.05)
1.37
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.002)
0.04
(0.003)
0.01
(0.04)
-0.95***
(0.12)
0.06***
(0.18)
0.14
(0.06)
3.26**
(0.10)

3.65
(0.02)
0.79
(0.03)
1.26*
(0.09)
-0.05
(0.05)
0.007
(0.03)
-0.47*
(0.07)
0.002
(0.007)
0.10
(0.05)
3.78***
(0.15)

Proportion
Latino

2.86***
(0.09)

2.74***
(0.11)

1.43***
(0.17)

2.60***
(0.37)

Latino
Immigration

0.27
(0.01)

0.06
(0.003)

0.06
(0.009)

-0.74***
(0.13)

871
.8570

829
.8485

880
.1015

885
.2651

Vacant Houses
Housing Density
White Age
Proportion Black
White
Disadvantage
Metro
Change in
Proportion of
Latinos in
Low-Skilled
Jobs

N=
R2

***p≤.001 **p≤.01 *p≤ .05; Unstandardized Beta coefficients are presented in the cells
with standardized Beta coefficients in the parentheses below them.
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The findings from an OLS regression predicting instrumental criminal offenses,
expressive criminal offenses, drug manufacturing and distribution offenses, and drug
possession offenses for blacks in the counties analyzed are reported in Table 5. Model 1
predicted instrumental crimes and displayed that the change of proportions of low-skill
jobs held by Latinos had no significant effect of black instrumental crime rate. Similarly,
Model 2, which predicted expressive crimes, showed no significant relationship between
the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and expressive crimes rates
committed by blacks. Model 3 predicted drug manufacturing and distribution crimes and
found no significant relationship between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held
by Latinos and the rate of drug manufacturing and distribution committed by blacks.
Model 4, however, which predicted drug possession crimes, found a significant, positive
relationship (4.36) between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos
and the drug possession rates of blacks. In sum, neither black instrumental nor black
expressive crimes were significantly affected by changes in the proportion of Latinos in
the low-skill labor market. Furthermore, drug manufacturing and distribution were not
significantly affected. However, black drug possession crimes were significantly affected.
This, however, does not support the original hypothesis.
Further information was derived from the control variables. Total population was
significantly, positively correlated with higher rates of both black instrumental crime
rates, as well as black expressive crime rates. Vacant houses were only significantly
correlated with black expressive crime rates. This relationship was positive. The
proportion of a county’s population who were black were significantly, positively
correlated with black instrumental and black expressive crime rates. However, the
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relationship was the opposite for black drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates, were
it was significantly, negatively correlated. Black disadvantage was significant and
positively correlated with both white instrumental and expressive crime rates.
However, percentage of people who moved in the past year was significantly,
negatively correlated with black instrumental crime rates, black drug
manufacturing/distribution crime rates, and black drug possession crime rates.
Furthermore, the proportion of a county’s population who were Latino was significantly,
negatively correlated with both black instrumental and black expressive crime rates, as
well as black drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates. Lastly, Latino Immigration
was significantly, negatively correlated with both black expressive crime rates, as well as
black drug possession rates.
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Table 5

Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates Predicting Logged Black
Crime Rates in U.S. Counties, 2010

Black
Instrumental
Crimes
Model 1
Total Population#
Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
Black Age
Proportion Black
Black
Disadvantage
Metro
Change in
Proportion of

Black
Expressive
Crimes
Model 2

Black
Drug
Manufacturing
and Distribution
Model 3

Black
Drug
Possession
Model 4

5.76***
(0.80)
-1.20**
(0.01)
1.75
(0.03)
1.43
(0.03)
0.008
(0.01)
6.66***
(0.24)
0.08**
(0.06)

4.09***
(0.75)
-1.31
(0.02)
2.54*
(0.05)
1.21
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
5.48***
(0.25)
0.09***
(0.08)

-1.39
(0.01)
-3.96**
(0.11)
-0.21
(0.01)
0.52
(0.03)
-0.005
(0.02)
-2.64***
(0.28)
0.03
(0.07)

-8.89
(0.02)
-4.31***
(0.16)
0.94
(0.06)
0.66
(0.06)
-0.02***
(0.13)
-1.63***
(0.23)
-0.01
(0.03)

0.16
(0.02)
4.20
(0.04)

0.21
(0.004)
5.13
(0.06)

0.07
(0.06)
3.26
(0.09)

0.10
(0.05)
4.36***
(0.15)

-2.55***
(0.08)
-0.97
(0.04)

-1.92**
(0.08)
-1.51**
(0.07)

-1.54***
(0.14)
-0.25
(0.03)

-0.06
(0.01)
-0.63*
(0.01)

870
.7057

828
.6291

872
.1046

Latinos in LowSkilled Jobs
Proportion Latino
Latino
Immigration
N=
R2

886
.1262

***p≤.001 **p≤.01 *p≤ .05; Unstandardized Beta coefficients are presented in the cells
with standardized Beta coefficients in the parentheses below them.
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The findings from an OLS regression predicting instrumental criminal offenses,
expressive criminal offenses, drug manufacturing and distribution offenses, and drug
possession offenses for urban whites in the counties analyzed are presented in Table 6.
Model 1, which predicted instrumental crimes, showed that the change of proportions of
low-skill jobs held by Latinos has no significant effect of urban white instrumental crime
rate. Similarly, Model 2, which predicted expressive crimes, showed no significant
relationship between the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and
expressive crimes rates committed by urban whites. However, Model 3, which predicted
drug manufacturing and distribution crimes, did find a significant, positive relationship
(4.19) between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and the rate of
drug manufacturing and distribution committed by whites. This means as the low-skill
labor market shifts in favor of Latinos, urban whites will experience higher drug
manufacturing and distribution rates. Model 4, which predicted drug possession rates,
displayed similar findings with a significant, positive relationship (3.78) occurring
between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and drug possession
rates of urban whites. This means as the low-skill labor market shifted in favor of
Latinos, urban whites experienced higher possession rates. However, contrary to the
original hypotheses, beta coefficients reveal that the effect of the change of proportion of
low-skill jobs held by Latinos was stronger for drug possession (0.15) than it was for
drug manufacturing and distribution (0.13). In sum, neither urban white instrumental nor
expressive crimes were significantly affected by changes in the proportion of Latinos in
the low-skill labor market. However, urban white drug manufacturing and distribution, as
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well as drug possession crimes were impacted, but not in the way the original hypothesis
predicted.
Further information was derived from the control variables. Total population was
significantly, positively correlated with higher rates of both urban white instrumental
crime rates, as well as urban white expressive crime rates. Furthermore, percentage of
people who have moved in the past year was also significantly, positively correlated with
higher rates of both urban white instrumental crime rates and urban white expressive
crime rates. Vacant houses were only significantly correlated with urban white drug
possession. This relationship was positive. Urban white disadvantage was significant and
positively correlated with both urban white instrumental and expressive crime rates, as
well as urban white drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates. The proportion of a
county’s population who were Latino was also significantly, positively correlated with
urban white instrumental crime rates, as well as urban white drug manufacturing/
distribution and drug possession crime rates.
Housing density, however, was significantly, and negatively correlated with urban
white instrumental crime rates and urban white expressive crime rates. This negative
relationship is also present with the proportion of a county’s residents who are black.
This relationship was significantly, negatively correlated with both urban white
instrumental and expressive crimes rates, as well as urban white drug
manufacturing/distribution and drug possession rates.
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Table 6

Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates Predicting Logged White
Crime Rates in Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2010

White
Instrumental
Crimes
Model 1
Total Population#

White
Expressive
Crimes
Model 2

White
Drug
Manufacturing
and Distribution
Model 3

White
Drug
Possession
Model 4

7.11***
(0.96)
7.94**
(0.06)
-1.21
(0.01)
-5.79***
(0.11)
0.01
(0.01)
-2.23***
(0.07)
0.12***
(0.08)

5.32***
(0.95)
6.91**
(0.07)
-1.24
(0.02)
-4.56***
(0.12)
0.004
(0.005)
-1.28**
(0.05)
0.11***
(0.09)

9.78
(0.05)
0.85
(0.03)
-0.99
(0.05)
-0.31
(0.03)
0.02
(0.06)
-0.66*
(0.08)
0.06***
(0.16)

3.53
(0.02)
0.63
(0.02)
0.23*
(0.01)
-0.86
(0.08)
0.005
(0.02)
-0.37
(0.06)
0.01
(0.02)

Change in
Proportion of
Latinos in LowSkilled Jobs

-4.81
(0.04)

-1.03
(0.01)

4.19*
(0.13)

3.78***
(0.15)

Proportion Latino

3.53***
(0.10)

1.47***
(0.18)

4.33***
(0.17)

Latino
Immigration

0.46
(0.02)

-0.06
(0.01)

-0.70**
(0.11)

Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
White Age
Proportion Black
White
Disadvantage

N=
R2

656
.8573

-2.32
(-0.02)
0.16
(0.01)
637
.8498

664
.1165

665
.2862

***p≤.001 **p≤.01 *p≤ .05; Unstandardized Beta coefficients are presented in the cells
with standardized Beta coefficients in the parentheses below them.
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The findings from an OLS regression predicting instrumental criminal offenses,
expressive criminal offenses, drug manufacturing and distribution offenses, and drug
possession offenses for urban blacks in the counties analyzed are presented in Table 7.
Model 1, which predicted instrumental crimes, displayed that the change of proportions
of low-skill jobs held by Latinos has no significant effect on urban black instrumental
crime rate. However, Model 2, which predicted expressive crimes, did show a significant,
positive relationship (7.41) between the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by
Latinos and expressive crimes rates committed by urban blacks. This provided support
for Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, Model 3, which predicts drug manufacturing and
distribution crimes, did find a significant, positive relationship (6.12) between the change
of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and the rate of drug manufacturing and
distribution committed by urban blacks. This means as the low-skill labor market shifted
in favor of Latinos, urban blacks experienced higher drug manufacturing and distribution
arrest rates. Model 4, which predicted drug possession crimes, displayed similar findings
with a significant, positive relationship (4.50) occurring between the change of
proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and drug possession rates of urban blacks.
This means as the low-skill labor market shifted in favor of Latinos, urban blacks
experienced higher possession arrest rates. However, according to the beta coefficients
and contrary to the original hypothesis, the effect of the change of proportion of low-skill
jobs held by Latinos was the same for drug possession (0.16), as it was for drug
manufacturing and distribution (0.16). In sum, urban black instrumental crimes were not
significantly affected by changes in the proportion of Latinos in the low-skill labor
market. However, urban black expressive crimes were significantly affected. This,
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however, does not support my original hypothesis. Both urban black drug manufacturing
and distribution crimes, as well as drug possession crimes were significantly affected.
However, according to the beta coefficients, they were affected at the same degree, which
does not support the original hypothesis.
Further information was derived from the control variables. Total population was
significantly, positively correlated with higher rates of both black instrumental crime
rates, as well as black expressive crime rates. The proportion of a county’s population
who were black was significantly, positively correlated with black instrumental and black
expressive crime rates. However, the relationship was the opposite for black drug
manufacturing/distribution crime rates, were it was significantly, negatively correlated.
Black disadvantage was significant and positively correlated with both black instrumental
and expressive crime rates. Black age was significantly, negatively correlated with black
drug possession crime rates.
However, percentage of people who moved in the past year was significantly,
negatively correlated both black drug manufacturing/ distribution and black drug
possession crime rates. Furthermore, the proportion of a county’s population who were
Latino was significantly, negatively correlated with both black instrumental and black
expressive crime rates, as well as black drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates.
Lastly, Latino Immigration was significantly, negatively correlated with both black
expressive crime rates.
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Table 7

Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates Predicting Logged Black
Crime Rates in Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2010

Black
Instrumental
Crimes
Model 1
Total Population#
Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
Black Age
Proportion Black
Black
Disadvantage
Change in
Proportion of

Black
Expressive
Crimes
Model 2

Black
Drug
Manufacturing
and Distribution
Model 3

Black
Drug
Possession
Model 4

5.75***
(0.79)
-3.63
(0.03)
1.49
(0.02)
1.24
(0.2)
0.005
(0.006)
8.34***
(0.26)
0.11**
(0.07)

4.08***
(0.74)
-3.03
(0.03)
2.79
(0.04)
1.18
(0.03)
0.007
(0.01)
6.85***
(0.27)
0.12***
(0.09)

5.93
(0.003)
-3.40*
(0.09)
-0.74
(0.03)
0.29
(0.02)
-0.004
(0.01)
-2.70***
(0.28)
0.08***
(0.16)

-5.75
(0.02)
-3.27**
(0.03)
0.32
(0.02)
0.37
(0.03)
-0.03**
(0.13)
-1.69***
(0.24)
0.01
(0.04)

5.70
(0.04)

7.41*
(0.07)

6.12**
(0.16)

4.50**
(0.16)

-2.94**
(0.09)
-0.89
(0.03)

-2.25**
(0.09)
-1.78*
(0.08)

-1.74***
(0.17)
-0.46
(0.05)

-0.004***
(0.001)
-0.55
(0.08)

656
.7124

637
.6379

658
.1210

666
.1159

Latinos in LowSkilled Jobs
Proportion Latino
Latino
Immigration
N=
R2

***p≤.001 **p≤.01 *p≤ .05; Unstandardized Beta coefficients are presented in the cells
with standardized Beta coefficients in the parentheses below them.
The findings from an OLS regression predicting instrumental criminal offenses,
expressive criminal offenses, drug manufacturing and distribution offenses, and drug
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possession offenses for rural whites in the counties analyzed in Table 8. Model 1, which
predicted instrumental crimes, showed that the change of proportions of low-skill jobs
held by Latinos had no significant effect on the rural white instrumental crime rate.
Similarly, Model 2, which predicted expressive crimes, showed no significant
relationship between the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and
expressive crimes rates committed by rural whites. Furthermore, Model 3, which
predicted drug manufacturing and distribution crimes, found no significant relationship
between the change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and the rate of drug
manufacturing and distribution committed by rural whites. Lastly, Model 4, which
predicted drug possession crimes, found no significant relationship occurring between the
change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and drug possession rates of rural
whites. In sum, changes in the proportion of Latinos in low-skill work does not
significantly affect instrumental crimes, expressive crimes, drug
manufacturing/distribution crimes, or drug possession crimes for rural whites.
Further information was derived from the control variables. Total population was
significantly, positively correlated with higher rates of both rural white instrumental
crime rates, as well as rural white expressive crime rates. However, total population was
significantly, negatively correlated with rural white drug manufacturing/distribution
crimes and rural white drug possession crimes rates. Vacant houses were only
significantly correlated with rural white instrumental crime rates and rural white drug
possession rates. This relationship was positive. Housing density was significantly,
positively correlated with rural white drug manufacturing/ distribution and rural white
drug possession crime rates. Rural white disadvantage was significant and positively
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correlated with both rural white instrumental and expressive crime rates, as well as rural
white drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates. The proportion of a county’s
population who were Latino was only positively correlated with drug possession crime
rates. White age was only significantly correlated with rural white expressive crime rates.
The relationship was positive.
The proportion of a county’s residents who are black was significantly, negatively
correlated with rural white instrumental and expressive crime rates, as well as rural white
drug manufacturing/ distribution crime rates. Lastly, Latino immigration was
significantly, negatively correlated with white drug possession crime rates.
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Table 8

Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates Predicting Logged White
Crime Rates in Non-Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2010

White
Instrumental
Crimes
Model 1
Total Population#
Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
White Age
Proportion Black
White
Disadvantage
Change in
Proportion of

White
Expressive
Crimes
Model 2

White
Drug
Manufacturing
and Distribution
Model 3

White
Drug
Possession
Model 4

4.72***
(0.67)
-0.06
(0.01)
0.37*
(0.13)
0.63
(0.11)
0.005
(0.12)
-0.38***
(0.26)
0.009*
(0.12)
0.22
(0.03)

4.49***
(0.66)
0.59
(0.12)
0.20
(0.07)
-0.35
(0.06)
0.008*
(0.17)
-0.35***
(0.25)
0.01**
(0.20)
0.51
(0.08)

-5.91*
(0.17)
1.05
(0.04)
1.93
(0.13)
6.39**
(0.23)
0.006
(0.03)
-1.68**
(0.23)
0.08**
(0.21)
0.73
(0.02)

-5.14*
(0.18)
-0.19
(0.01)
3.02***
(0.25)
5.67***
(0.02)
0.13
(0.03)
-0.59
(0.10)
0.01
(0.04)
1.83
(0.07)

0.08
(0.04)
0.14
(0.12)

0.18
(0.10)
0.09
(0.07)

0.75
(0.08)
0.55
(0.09)

1.76**
(0.23)
-0.77*
(0.15)

Latinos in LowSkilled Jobs
Proportion Latino
Latino
Immigration
N=
R2

215
.5573

192
.4637

216
.1347

220
.2872

***p≤.001 **p≤.01 *p≤ .05; Unstandardized Beta coefficients are presented in the cells
with standardized Beta coefficients in the parentheses below them.
The findings from an OLS regression predicting instrumental criminal offenses,
expressive criminal offenses, drug manufacturing and distribution offenses, and drug
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possession offenses for rural blacks in the counties analyzed in Table 9. Model 1, which
predicted instrumental crimes, showed that the change of proportions of low-skill jobs
held by Latinos has no significant effect on the rural black instrumental crime rate.
Similarly, Model 2, which predicted expressive crimes, showed no significant
relationship between the change of proportions of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and
expressive crimes rates committed by rural blacks. Furthermore, Model 3, which
predicted drug manufacturing crimes, found no significant relationship between the
change of proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and the rate of drug manufacturing
and distribution committed by rural blacks. Lastly, Model 4, which predicted drug
possession crimes, found no significant relationship occurring between the change of
proportion of low-skill jobs held by Latinos and drug possession rates of rural blacks. In
sum, changes in the proportion of Latinos in low-skill work does not significantly affect
instrumental crimes, expressive crimes, drug manufacturing/distribution crimes, or drug
possession crimes for rural blacks.
Further information was derived from the control variables. Total population was
significantly, positively correlated with higher rates of both rural black instrumental
crime rates, as well as rural black expressive crime rates. However, total population was
significantly, negatively correlated with rural black drug manufacturing/distribution
crimes and rural black drug possession crimes rates. Housing density was significantly,
positively correlated rural black drug possession crime rates. The proportion of a
county’s population who were black was positively correlated with rural black
instrumental and expressive crime rates. However, the relationship was the opposite for
rural black drug manufacturing/distribution, as well as rural black drug possession crime
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rates. Black disadvantage was significantly, negatively correlated with black drug
manufacturing/distribution, as well as black drug possession crime rates
Table 9

Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates Predicting Logged Black
Crime Rates in Non-Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2010

Black
Instrumental
Crimes
Model 1
Total Population#
Moved
Vacant Houses
Housing Density
Black Age
Proportion Black
Black
Disadvantage
Change in
Proportion of

Black
Expressive
Crimes
Model 2

Black
Drug
Manufacturing
and Distribution
Model 3

Black
Drug
Possession
Model 4

3.60***
(0.36)
-0.12
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.004)
0.77
(0.01)
0.001
(0.02)
1.55***
(0.76)
0.004
(0.04)
0.47
(0.05)

3.82***
(0.39)
-0.17
(0.03)
0.25
(0.06)
-0.28
(0.04)
0.001
(0.02)
1.21***
(0.63)
0.005
(0.05)
0.22
(0.03)

-3.09
(0.07)
-5.83*
(0.19)
0.07
(0.004)
5.03
(0.15)
0.003
(0.01)
-2.28***
(0.26)
-0.07*
(0.17)
-2.86
(0.08)

-2.58
(0.08)
-6.88***
(0.29)
1.70
(0.12)
4.73*
(0.18)
-0.01
(0.09)
-1.18*
(0.17)
-0.07**
-0.20)
4.08
(0.14)

0.09
(0.03)
0.04
(0.02)

0.08
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)

-1.31
(0.11)
0.23
(0.03)

-0.02
(0.002)
-0.79
(0.14)

Latinos in LowSkilled Jobs
Proportion Latino
Latino
Immigration
N=
R2

214
.6135

191
.4729

214
.1652

220
.1949

***p≤.001 **p≤.01 *p≤ .05; Unstandardized Beta coefficients are presented in the cells
with standardized Beta coefficients in the parentheses below them.
58

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

Prior research has established a link between community disorganization and
increased crime rates. Additionally, prior research has also found that competition in the
low-skill labor market associated with Latino immigration can increase the effects of
disorganization. Due to the impact of the stopping circular work visas and other
immigration policies, the Latino population in America increased to 50.5 million in 2012.
This increase, in addition to the primarily low-skill nature of the Latino labor force,
resulted in increased competition in the American low-skill labor market. Research found
that this increased competition resulted in increased crime in these communities. Past
research also indicates that communities, even ones thought to be disorganized, may have
the ability to selectively control crimes in their confines. Therefore, this study predicted
that drug manufacturing/distribution crimes and instrumental crimes, which are
financially motivated, would increase in communities where this competition in the lowskill market is evident, but not drug possession and expressive crimes.
The findings from this study did not support the original hypotheses proposed,
except that low-skill job competition was more strongly correlated with crime for urban
blacks than urban whites. Regarding hypotheses 1, which stated that communities where
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the low-skill labor market has shifted in favor of Latinos will see a stronger increase in
significance of drug distribution and manufacturing crimes than drug possession, the data
did not support this for any of the models. In fact, drug possession saw a more significant
increase than drug manufacturing and distribution for the full white model, the urban
white model, and the full black model.
Hypothesis 2, which stated that in communities where the low-skilled labor
market shifted in favor of Latinos there would be a larger increase in instrumental crimes
than expressive crimes, was not supported. The results for the relationship between the
proportion of low-skilled jobs held by Latinos and the rates of instrumental crimes were
not significant for either the full white or full black model. This relationship was not
significant for urban blacks or urban whites either. Furthermore, the relationship was not
significant for either rural whites or rural blacks. The same is nearly true for the
relationship between the proportion of low-skilled jobs held by Latinos and the rates of
expressive crimes. The only model where significance was found between the proportion
of low-skilled jobs held by Latinos and the rates of expressive crimes was the Urban
black model. This provides no support for Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3, which stated that the effect of the loss of low-skill labor on crime
will be positive and have a stronger effect for rural whites than rural blacks was not
supported. There were differences found in the effect of the shift of the low-skill labor
market on drug possession and drug manufacturing/distribution charges between urban
and rural communities. The shift of the low-skill labor market correlated with a
significant, positive increase in both drug manufacturing and distribution and drug
possession for urban whites, but not rural whites. Likewise, this shift correlated with a
significant, positive increase in expressive crimes, drug manufacturing/distribution, and
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drug possession crimes for urban blacks, but not rural blacks. This difference displays a
potential stronger effect of the disorganizing abilities of low-skill job competition in
urban areas for both blacks and whites. Though there was no support for hypothesis 3, the
difference in the correlation between low-skill job competition and crime between rural
and urban communities has clear policy implications. It suggests that job training and
employment programs might be more effective for combatting crime in urban
communities. However, since job competition doesn’t appear to be correlated with
increased crime rates in rural communities, efforts might be better focused elsewhere,
such as in improving education.
However, Hypothesis 4, which stated that the effect of the loss of low-skill labor
on crime will be positive and have a stronger effect for urban blacks than urban whites,
was supported. Racial differences can be seen in the results as well. Though the full black
and white models did not reveal any significant differences, there were significant effects
in the urban models. Urban blacks saw a significant, positive increase in expressive
crimes. However, urban whites did not. Additionally, though both urban whites and urban
blacks saw significant, positive increase in both drug possession and drug
manufacturing/distribution, the effect was stronger for urban blacks in both of these
models, thus supporting hypothesis 4. These results suggest a few possibilities. Firstly,
they suggest that the effects of disorganization in communities is stronger for urban
blacks. Alternatively, that these communities organize themselves in different ways due
to a shortage of work or social networks. However, due to the results not falling in line
with the original hypotheses, other explanations need to be considered.
Additionally, in general, the R-squares for the regression models run in this study
suggested that the variables used explained a large amount of the variance for expressive
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and instrumental crime rates, but a low amount of the variance for drug manufacturing/
distribution and drug possession crime rates. For example, in the all-white model, the
variables used in the regression explained 85.7% of the variance for instrumental crime
rates and 84.9% for expressive crime rates. However, for whites, the same variables only
explained 10.2% of the variance for drug manufacturing/distribution crime rates and
26.5% for drug possession rates. This trend was consistent for the other models run in the
study for both blacks and whites. The variables used explained large amounts of the
variance for both instrumental and expressive crimes rates, but lower amounts of drug
manufacturing/ distribution crime rates.
This could possibly be due to the ways the different crimes are measured and
what they represent. Both the instrumental and expressive crime rate variables in this
study measure multiple types of crimes respective to that category. However, both the
drug manufacturing/distribution and drug possession crime rate variables measure a
specific crime. This generalness of the expressive and instrumental crime rate variables
may allow for more variance to be explained due to potential common attributes shared
by the crimes in each category. However, since both of the drug crime rate variables
measure more specific types of crime, then those specific crimes may not share the same
causes of variance as more general measures of crime. The variables that are associated
with crime in general may not necessarily explain specific crimes.
The fact that whites did not see a significant increase in instrumental or
expressive crimes, and that urban blacks were the only group to see an increase in
expressive crimes is reminiscent of Anderson’s (1999) work. Anderson (1999) proposed
that deindustrialization, racism, and economic and societal deprivation resulted in a
subculture developing within urban black communities. This subculture abided by a code,
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the “code of the street”, which placed a higher value on violence and non-conformity in
relation to general society. This code was not meant to make up ground economically,
such as instrumental type crimes, but to gain a semblance of status. Anderson suggested
that, since members of these communities were disregarded by general white society and
had little means of gaining status by conventional means, that the code of the street was a
way for these people to gain status and respect in their own terms.
Supportive evidence for this argument can be seen in how whites, both rural and
urban, saw no increase in either expressive or instrumental crimes. Additionally, rural
blacks saw no increase in these areas either. Urban blacks were the only group to see an
increase in expressive crimes. This abides by Anderson’s proposition that the code
functions not to better urban blacks’ economic situation, but to gain status through
violence under the guide of an unconventional code of conduct.
However, the results of this study show that Anderson’s argument may not be
applicable outside of urban communities. Though crime increased for urban black and
white communities in this study, it did not increase for rural black or white communities
in the same way. Though Anderson’s work provides a theoretical paradigm to understand
the increase in expressive crimes in urban communities, it does not explain why this
increase is not present in rural ones. Jennifer Sherman’s (2009) study of poor, rural
communities gives a potential explanation for this difference. In her study, she discovered
that even though these rural communities were experiencing issues with poverty as a
result of deindustrialization and shifting labor markets, crime was not increasing as one
might expect (Sherman, 2009). Members of these communities appeared to abide by a
strict moral code. Being impoverished was not necessarily looked down upon. However,
how one lived in poverty was something that people in these communities judged
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(Sherman, 2009). Working for a living was viewed as the most respectable and moral
way to bring in income, and welfare was considered the least moral way. However,
committing crimes to make money was also considered immoral to members of these
communities, even if one was poor. Rather than turn to crime, members of these
communities were expected to adapt to the changing circumstances of where they lived.
Examples of this included shifting to different types of jobs, cutting back on spending,
growing food in gardens, or doing odd jobs for money (Sherman, 2009). This seems
contrary to how Anderson depicted impoverished urban neighborhoods. Rather than
forming a contradictory code of violence in response to lack of opportunities, these
communities used a moral code to inform their decisions, and this moral code stressed
making money by “moral” ways.
The control variables of many of the models run in this study provide potentially
useful information for social disorganization theory. Disadvantage for both whites and
blacks is positively associated with crime in all models except for rural black, suggesting
that disadvantage is a strong predictor of higher crime rates. In every model run, the total
population of counties was correlated significantly and positively with higher
instrumental and expressive crime rates. However, total population was not significantly
correlated with either drug manufacturing/distribution or drug possession in any of the
models except for rural whites. In the rural whites model, the relationship was negative.
These findings suggest that different crimes correlate with different forms of
disorganization in different contexts.
This is further demonstrated by how both the white and black models had
different relationships with the black population and the Latino population. In all of the
white models run, proportion black was significantly and negatively associated with
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crime. Furthermore, in all of the white models, proportion Latino was significantly and
positively correlated with crime. However, the opposite relationship exists in the black
models. For both the all black model and the urban black models, proportion black was
correlated with higher crime rates, and proportion Latino was negatively correlated with
crime rates. This relationship demonstrates the potential that controlling for other
variables has for social disorganization. When job competition with Latinos is controlled
for, as well as other forms of disorganization, higher number of blacks ends up not being
associated with higher white crime. However, the same is not true for the all black or
urban black models. Higher proportion of blacks is associated with higher rates of crimes
in general with the all black and urban black model, suggesting that increased number of
blacks affects whites and blacks differently. The same is true for Latinos. The positive
correlation between the proportion of Latinos and white crime, even when controlling for
job competition with Latinos, suggests that Latinos are not competing with whites for
work as much as other populations. The negative correlation in the all black and urban
black models, however, imply the opposite. Since job competition is controlled for, these
models suggest that Latinos are competing with blacks for work, but that it’s the
competition for jobs, not Latinos themselves, that are affecting black crime.
Additional examples of contextually based crime increases can be seen in how
housing density decreases general crime for both the full white model and the urban
white model, but increases drug crimes in the rural white model. Furthermore, housing
density almost never affects the black models. The only time there is a significant
correlation is in the rural black model. This trend is continued in the variable for
percentage of residents who have moved in the past year. For both the all-white and
urban white models, this increased general crime. However, for every black model run,
65

this variable was associated with decreased drug crimes. For black drug crimes, this
could be due to the network based structure of the drug trade. If people the population of
a community is inconsistent, this may make keeping the networks up difficult. However,
this population transition is does not help white crime. These relationships continue to
demonstrate how different factors of disorganization can affect different people in
different context in different ways.
These implications from the data show that low-skill job competition as a result of
Latino immigration doesn’t just disorganize communities evenly. For both the full
models and urban models for both blacks and whites, both drug possession and drug
manufacturing/distribution significantly increased. However, this effect is felt much more
strongly for urban communities than it is for rural ones. This adds to previous work (e.g.
Shihedah & Ousey, 1998; Shihedah & Barranco, 2010a; Shihedah & Barranco, 2010b) by
showing that the effects of low-skill job competition extend beyond just homicide and
violent crime. However, at the same time, the results suggest that perhaps communities
are not as affected in the same ways. The effects of disorganization and labor market
changes are place, context, and people oriented. Though urban communities saw
increases of crime in relation to increased job competition, rural ones did not see the
same results. Furthermore, urban whites did not see as strong of a correlation between job
competition and crime and urban blacks did. This displays the importance of place, and
how different places affect different kinds of people. Though the competition for lowskill work creates incentive for financially motivated crimes, these types of crimes did
not increase at a significantly higher rate than expressive crimes. This may suggest that
competition for low-skill work does not create financially motivated offenders, but
instead creates offenders motivated by decreased status, as suggested by Anderson
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(1999). However, the effects of different forms of disorganization seem to be context
based.
Contributions
This study contributes to the literature pertaining to social disorganization theory
by displaying how specific crimes and circumstances intersect in different communities.
Though expressive and instrumental crimes appear to not be affected by competition in
the low-skill labor market for white communities, the results seem to be different for
black communities. Furthermore, the effect is not felt the same amongst all black
communities. Expressive crimes only significantly increase in urban black communities,
but not for rural black communities. However, drug possession crimes and drug
manufacturing/distribution crimes significantly increased in both the full white and black
models, as well as the urban white and black models, but not in the rural models. These
differences demonstrate the importance of place and context. Neither black nor white
rural communities saw positive correlations between Latino low-skill job competition and
crime. The different reactions to disorganization by rural and urban communities
strengthen the argument that place and context matter. Rural and urban communities
appear to be reacting differently to different forms of disorganization, and may in fact be
organizing themselves differently. Lastly, the patterns that the R-squared measures take
throughout all the models further demonstrates how variables that explain high amounts
of variance for general crime may not necessarily explain much of the variance in more
specific measures of crime.
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Limitations
This study is hindered by certain limitations. The use of macro-level data prevents
this study from being able to understand individual motivation for why crimes are
committed. We can only make assumptions about why particular crimes were committed
based on of this type of data. Perceptions and individual motivations are beyond the
scope of this study. Being able to understand these perceptions and motivations would
allow researchers to better understand which criminological framework better explains
the reasons that these crimes are being committed. Furthermore, the lack of information
and data on undocumented immigrants does limit the ability of this study to fully account
for the full effect of Latino immigration and its effect on the low-skill job market and
crime. The findings of this study are a conservative estimate of the impact Latinos have
on certain crimes through their competitive impact on the low-skill labor market.
Additionally, as with all studies that use official data, there are limitations regarding what
conclusions can be drawn. Unreported crimes are not included in UCR databases.
Therefore, a full picture of expressive, instrumental, drug possession, and drug
manufacturing/distribution crimes cannot be made. Not all counties have the same
reporting procedures, and therefore consistency cannot be assumed for the data.
Future Research
Future research into this area of criminological study should consider why these
differences in community levels crimes occur. What really influences why urban black
communities are the only ones who increase significantly in expressive crimes in
response to low-skill job competition? Future studies could also use multilevel analyses,
using both individual-level data and macro-level data to understand community trends.
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Furthermore, a consistent measure for undocumented immigration would assist in better
accounting for the actual effect of Latino immigration. Further research could also study
the effects of low-skill job competition on different, more specified crimes. This would
allow for a better understanding of how specific types of crime are affected by this event.
Lastly, though the original hypotheses mostly did not work, the results did suggest that
not all crimes are affected by disorganization. Future research should examine why
disorganization only affects certain crimes and not others, as well as what conditions lead
to only these particular crimes increasing.
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